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1 Introduction
This paper is a theoretical contribution to the literature on job search and unemployment insurance. We
revisit the signalling hypothesis, whereby potential employers use the duration of unemployment as a
signal as to the productivity of applicants. Managers are typically reluctant to interview the longterm
unemployed because other managers interviewed and would have hired these workers if they had been
productive1 . We suggest that the quality of such a signal is very low when the unemployed receive unem-
ployment benets: individuals have good reasons to remain unemployed. Conversely, the signal becomes
much more e¢ cient once benets have elapsed: skilled workers should not stay unemployed in such cases.
Therefore, the potential duration of unemployment benets should drive employers expectations and
their recruitment practices. This mechanism can explain why hazards fall after benet expiration, and
why hazard rates respond more to the potential duration of benets than to replacement rates.
Why is this important? Our paper is mostly theoretical. However, it can also be used to address two
empirical puzzles that standard job search theory hardly explains.
On the one hand, hazard rates increase prior to the exhaustion date, and strongly decline afterwards.
Most of the unemployment compensation systems of the OECD countries deliver declining benets with
the unemployment spell. Benets are proportional to the pre-unemployment wage for short unemploy-
ment spells, while they drop to a common standard determined by the public assistance system for longer
durations. Since the late 1980s, a number of contributions have shown that the probability of leaving
unemployment dramatically rises just prior to benets lapse (see e.g. Mo¢ tt, 1985, Meyer, 1990, and
Katz and Meyer, 1990, for the US, Ham and Rhea, 1987, for Canada, Carling et al, 1996, for Sweden,
Joutard and Ruggiero, 1996, and Dormont et al, 2006, for France; Van Ours and Vodopivec, 2006, for
Slovenia; see also Card et al, 2007, for a di¤erent perspective). However, hazard rates fall after they peak
around the exhaustion date. The rise in hazard is predicted by the standard job search theory: reser-
vation wages go down and search e¤orts go up as the exhaustion date becomes closer (see for instance
Mortensen, 1977, 1986, and Van den Berg, 1990). However, the theory also predicts that hazard rates
should stay constant afterwards, while they typically fall.
On the other hand, estimates show that the duration of unemployment positively responds to the
various components of unemployment compensation generosity. However, it is more responsive to changes
in potential duration than to changes in replacement rate. Well-known studies nd positive and signicant
e¤ects on unemployment duration from higher benets (see for instance Narendranathan et al, 1985,
Katz and Meyer, 1990, Van den Berg, 1990, who obtain an elasticity of duration to benet typically
lower than one). However, there is a wide dispersion in estimates, and several studies do not nd any
e¤ects (see Nickell, 1979, for the UK, Lynch, 1989, for the US, Hujer and Schneider, 1989, for Germany,
Groot, 1990, for the Netherlands), or even a negative impact (see Jones, 1996, for Canada). Fewer
studies examine the elasticity of average duration to potential duration. However, they conclude that
this elasticity is indubitably positive (see Mo¢ tt, 1985, and Katz and Meyer, 1990, for the US, Ham and
Rea, 1987, for Canada, Ham et al, 1998, for the Czech and Slovak Republics). This asymmetric response
1Oberholzer-Gee (2008) displays direct evidence in favor of such a thesis. He conducted a survey among 766 managers
in Switzerland who are responsible for hiring at administrative assistant level. Among the various reasons why they may
prefer an employed worker to a 24-month nonemployed, they predominantly answer that they "prefer the candidate with a
job because the unemployed applicant is probably not very productive. If she were productive, she would have been hired
by another rm.
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of unemployment duration to benet level and benet duration is nicely illustrated by Katz and Meyer
(1990), also quoted in Atkinson and Micklewright (1991). They perform simulations from their estimates
and show that a given UI expenditure cut achieved via reducing the length of entitlement has twice the
e¤ect on unemployment duration of one coming via a cut in benet levels. This asymmetry is usually
downplayed on the basis of its supposed inconsistency. If the potential duration of benets plays a role,
this must be so because the unemployed lose some income. As the magnitude of the loss is governed by
replacement rates, replacement rates should also be part of the story2 .
In this paper, equilibrium hazard rates result from the interplay between workersjob search strate-
gies and employershiring strategies. We elaborate on Lockwood (1991), who examines the argument
according to which the duration of unemployment conveys a signal on workers ability, which leads em-
ployers to discriminate against the long-term unemployed. We argue that moral hazard e¤ects induced
by unemployment compensation alter the value of the signal in a way that is consistent with the two
empirical regularities highlighted previously.
A key aspect of our contribution relies on its ability to feature a realistic pattern of hazard rates
as an equilibrium outcome of a model with worker heterogeneity, imperfect information, signalling, and
moral hazard. Our model follows Lockwood (1991) with the noticeable exceptions that workers are
allowed to set their search e¤ort and there is duration-dependent unemployment compensation. There
are two types of workers, good and bad, and rms are only willing to hire the good workers. At the
beginning of unemployment episode, all workers are fully entitled to unemployment benets. After a
xed interval of time, benets fall to a lower level. Workers can set a low search e¤ort or a high one. At
the time of interview, rms have a positive probability of detecting a bad worker. This assumption has
two implications. First, this ensures that exit rates are lower for the bad workers than for the good ones
at given search e¤ort. Second, this drives employersexpectations on workerstype by unemployment
duration. The bottom line argument is that workers who stayed unemployed for long have probably been
interviewed elsewhere, and some other manager detected something wrong with the worker.
In this environment, agents have to select unemployment duration-contingent strategies that are
mutually consistent in equilibrium. Workers set the pace of search e¤ort, while rms set their hiring
policy. The model may display di¤erent equilibrium congurations. We focus on one of them that is
empirically relevant. We name it a baseline equilibrium3 . A baseline equilibrium features three properties.
(i) Bad workers always choose a low search e¤ort. Unlike good workers, bad workers may be rejected
by employers on the basis of the signal they send while interviewed. The marginal return to high search
e¤ort is so low that they decide not to seek jobs with a high intensity. (ii) Good agents start seeking
jobs with a low e¤ort, then set a high e¤ort prior to the potential duration of benets. The opportunity
cost of high search e¤ort goes down with unemployment duration. This leads the good workers to set
a high search e¤ort as the exhaustion date becomes closer. (iii) Firms set a larger than the exhaustion
date duration above which applicants always get rejected. The proportion of good workers among the
applicants rapidly falls with duration around the exhaustion date. Firms adjust their beliefs accordingly
and do not hire the long-term unemployed. We provide the set of necessary and su¢ cient conditions that
leads to the existence and uniqueness of such a baseline equilibrium.
2For instance, the entitlement e¤ect put forward by Mortensen (1977) can explain why benet levels may have a negative
impact on average duration. However, the potential duration of benets should also have a negative e¤ect in such a case.
3We discuss alternative equilibrium congurations in subsection 4.1.
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Then, we analyze how hazard rates respond to changes in the institutional environment. All the dif-
ferent components of unemployment insurance (potential duration and benet levels before and after the
exhaustion date) originate moral hazard e¤ects and as such weaken the signal conveyed by unemployment
duration. Therefore, both the duration at which good workers start searching for a job with a high e¤ort,
and the cut-o¤ duration above which employers start rejecting applicants, are increasing in unemploy-
ment insurance generosity. However, the magnitude of the impact of each component depends on one key
parameter: the return to search of a high e¤ort. When this parameter is large, good agents wait for a
long time before setting a high search investment. In the non-frictional case where this parameter tends
to innity, individuals set a high e¤ort once they have reached the exhaustion date and immediately get
a job o¤er. Firms rationally expect they will only meet bad agents once the exhaustion date has elapsed
and systematically reject all such applicants. More generally, the higher the return to search of a high
e¤ort, the closer the cuto¤ duration to the exhaustion date. Interestingly, benet levels before and after
the exhaustion date only marginally a¤ect this statement. This may explain why hazard rates respond
substantially to the potential duration of benets and not that much to benet levels.
Very few papers explain the decline in hazard after the exhaustion date. Two types of arguments
have been put forward. First, seeking a job may require reducing the leisure time. Mortensen (1977)
shows that if leisure and consumption are substitutes, then a fall in benets raises the opportunity cost of
searching and hazard rates go down. Second, benets can be used to improve job search e¢ ciency. This
argument is due to Tannery (1983). In such a case, the opportunity cost of seeking a job is the marginal
utility of consumption. When benets go down, the marginal utility of consumption goes up and search
spendings are reduced (see Ben-Horim and Zuckerman, 1988, and Decreuse, 2002).
Our paper is related to contributions that emphasize the role of employersbeliefs and hiring strategies
to explain duration dependence in hazard rates. In Blanchard and Diamond (1994), employers can meet
several applicants at a time and marginally prefer workers with a short duration. Resulting hazard
rates display negative duration dependence. In Coles and Masters (2000), skills depreciate during the
unemployment episode. Owing to recruitment costs, employers set a cut-o¤ duration very similar to
Lockwoods and ours above which employers reject all applications. Our paper goes a step forward by
highlighting the interaction between job search and recruitment strategies. It also argues that the design
of unemployment compensation is a key variable a¤ecting the outcome of such an interaction.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our model and examines individ-
ual strategies. Section 3 is devoted to the analysis of equilibrium. Section 4 discusses some empirical
implications. Section 5 concludes.
All proofs are gathered in the Appendix.
2 The model
This section introduces the main assumptions of the model, considers the microeconomic choices made by
individuals and rms, and characterizes the composition of unemployment by workerstype and duration.
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2.1 Environment
We depart from Lockwood (1991) in three ways. First, there are unemployment benets whose potential
duration is nite. Second, workers make search e¤orts. Third, the matching technology does not depend
on the number of vacancies.4
We are interested in the steady-state of a continuous time economy populated by a continuum of
rms and workers. All agents have the same felicity function v which positively depends on consumption.
They discount time at rate  > 0.
At each instant, a new cohort of individuals of total size n > 0 enters unemployment. This cohort
is composed of 0n good individuals, and (1  0)n bad individuals, 0 2 (0; 1). All these people are
initially entitled to unemployment benets. Workers only di¤er in their productivity, with yg > yb.
Workers can either be employed, unemployed, or non-participant. To ensure the existence of a steady-
state number of unemployed, we assume that agents die/retire at rate n. When unemployed, agents have
to seek a job, which means choosing a search e¤ort e. There are two levels of e¤ort: either e¤ort is high
and e = h > 0, or e¤ort is low and e = 0. The cost of e¤ort is ce, c > 0. This implies that the cost of a
low e¤ort is normalized to zero. The probability of contacting a vacant position in the time interval dt is
m (1 + e) dt.
Each rm is endowed with a single job slot, which can either be lled or vacant. Firms endowed
with a vacant position must incur the cost  > 0. Filled jobs produce either yg or yb, depending on
the workers type. There is a single wage w 2 (yb; yg), which is set exogenously. We discuss alternative
assumptions on the wage setting in subsection 4.2. As a result of this wage, rms do not want to hire
bad workers who generate negative prots. However, the workers type is imperfectly observable. Firms
receive a private signal on the workers type at the time of interview. If the worker is good, the signal is
good with probability g = 1. If the worker is bad, the signal is good with probability b =  2 (0; 1).
It is bad with the complementary probability5 1   . Once a worker has found a job, he/she leaves the
search market forever and enjoys the utility level W = v (w) =r.
The fact that employed workers leave the search market forever deserves further comments. We here
follow Lockwood who argues that accounting for job loss would complicate the model in an unexpected
way: rms would condition their hiring strategies on cumulative durations of unemployment spells.
Although there is some empirical support for this phenomenon, it can be neglected in the rst place to
shed light on the mechanisms that are specic to this paper.6
The ow number of matches depends only on the number and e¤orts of job-seekers. Let u denote
the mass-number of active unemployed, and let e denote their average search e¤ort. The total number
of matches is um (1 + e). Matching is random, which means that meetings are equiprobably distributed
4The latter assumption allows us to neglect the labor demand side of the model, while focusing on the novel aspects that
we stress.
5This is a reduced form of Lockwood, who assumes that rms can choose whether to test workers prior to hiring them.
The parameter i is then the probability of passing the test. Good workers are always successful and g = 1, while bad
workers may fail and b 2 (0; 1).
6One may wonder where workers entitled to unemployment benets come from in a world without job destruction. We
implicitly focus on a particular segment of the job market that is mostly reserved to experienced workers who already spent
some time in their rst job. The new cohort of workers is composed of those workers who lost or quit their rst jobs.
Alternative assumptions may be considered to preserve the general meaning of the model. They would come at the cost of
losing its simplicity.
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between the two sides of the markets, i.e. good and bad workers have the same probability of contacting
a vacant job. The contact rate for a vacant position is m=, where  = v=[u (1 + e)] is the labor market
tightness.
The unemployment compensation scheme runs as follows. Unemployed workers receive unemployment
benets b (s) contingent on unemployment duration s. Let T be the potential duration of unemployment
benets. We have:
b (s) =
(
bmax > 0 if s  T
bmin < bmax else
(1)
To ensure that agents do not refuse job o¤ers, bmax < w.
2.2 Job-seeker behavior
In this sub-section, we examine the job-seeking behavior of unemployed individuals at given rmshiring
policy.
Let Ui (s) denote the value function of a type i unemployed whose unemployment duration is s. We
have
rUi (s) = max
e=h;0
fv (b (s)) +m (1 + e)i (s) [W   Ui (s)]  ce+ U 0i (s)g ()
where r = +n is the e¤ective discount rate, and i (s) 2 [0; 1] is the probability that the worker becomes
hired once he contacted a vacancy. The reason why this probability is denoted i (s) will be made clear
below. The hazard rate has three components: job availability, summarized by parameter m, worker
search e¤orts, captured by (1 + e), and rmshiring policy i (s).
Workers search behavior depends on the probability of getting the job once interviewed. In the
remaining, we solve the optimization problem () for a particular hiring policy that will be the equilibrium
one. This policy is dened by Assumption A1.
Assumption A1 Firmshiring policy is given by
i (s) =
(
i if s  , with  > T
0 else
According to this policy, rms reject applicants whenever they receive a bad signal during the inter-
view. This event occurs with probability 0 when the worker is good, and with probability 1    when
the worker is bad. In addition, employers discriminate against the long-term unemployed: employers do
not hire the workers who remain unemployed more time than the cut-o¤ duration . We restrict our
attention to the empirically plausible case where   T . In what follows, we will refer to this particular
conguration as the baseline equilibrium conguration. We will provide additional restrictions later to
ensure that such an equilibrium exists.
The optimization problem () can be written as follows
rUi (s) = max
e=h;0
fv (b (s)) +m (1 + e)i [W   Ui (s)]  ce+ U 0i (s)g (2)
rUi () = v (bmin) (3)
The resulting value function Ui (s) is strictly decreasing for all s 2 [0;].
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Let ei (s) denote the optimal trajectory of e¤ort. This trajectory satises ei (s) = h if and only if
im [W   Ui (s)]  c (4)
This implies that either ei (s) = 0 for all s  0, or there exists a unique duration i 2 [0;] such that
ei (s) = h i¤ s  i.
The problem must be solved backward. In the remaining, ai = im (1 + h).
Step 1. If im [v (w)  v (bmin)] < rc, then ei (s) = 0 for all s  0. If not, go to Step 2.
Step 2. Solve the following Cauchy problem for all s  
rx1i (s) = v (bmin) + ai

W   x1i (s)
  ch+ x10i (s) (5)
rx1i () = v (bmin) (6)
This yields
x1i (s) =
v (bmin) + aiW   ch
r + ai
h
1  e (r+ai)( s)
i
+
v (bmin)
r
e (r+ai)( s)
If im

W   x1i (T )

< c, then i is such that im

W   x1i (i)

= c. If not, go to Step 3.
Step 3. Solve the following Cauchy problem for all s  T
rx2i (s) = v (bmax) + ai

W   x2i (s)
  ch+ x20i (s) (7)
x2i (T ) = x
1
i (T ) (8)
This yields
x2i (s) =
v (bmax) + aiW   ch
r + ai
h
1  e (r+ai)(T s)
i
+x1i (T ) e
 (r+ai)(T s)
If im

W   x2i (0)

< c, then i is such that im

W   x2i (i)

= c. If not, ei (s) = h for all s  .
Note that eb () = h implies that eh () = h. This property allows us to focus on the conguration
where eg () = h and eb () = 0.
Assumption A2 m [v (w)  v (bmin)] < rc
Assumption A3 m

W   x2g (0)

< c < m

W   x1g (T )

The following Proposition summarizes our results.
Proposition 1 Job-seekersefforts
Let
 = T + ln
24 v (bmax) + c r+mm   v (w)
v (bmax)  v (bmin) +

m (1 + h) v(w) v(bmin)r   ch

e (r+m(1+h))( T )
35 1r+m(1+h) (9)
Under Assumptions A1 to A3,
(i) Bad workers set eb (s) = 0 for all s  0;
(ii) Good workers set eg (s) = h if s 2 [;] and eg (s) = 0 else
7
Assumption A2 ensures that bad workers always set the low level of e¤ort. Assumptions A3 guarantees
that good workers set the high level of e¤ort before they have reached the potential duration of benets
T , but after some time spent in unemployment that is  2 (0; T ). Note that Assumptions A1 to A3
are necessary and su¢ cient conditions.
Figure 1 depicts the resulting patterns of hazard rates.
[Insert Figure 1]
The hazard rate of good workers features the typical spike prior to losing benet entitlement. The
spike in hazard lasts until rms discriminate against the long-term unemployed. At the same time, the
hazard rate of bad workers is at throughout the spell of unemployment.
We focus on this particular conguration for simplicity. We discuss alternative equilibrium congu-
rations and some empirical implications in Section 4.
2.3 The composition of unemployment
The previous subsection carefully examines job-seekersbehavior and resulting hazards. In this Subsec-
tion, we analyze the implications of such hazard rates on the distribution of unemployment spells, the
distribution of type by unemployment duration, and the distribution of contact by type and unemploy-
ment duration.
Let ui (s; t) denote the size of the cohort of type-i unemployed whose unemployment duration is s as
of time t. It evolves according to the following partial di¤erential equation:
@ui (s; t)
@s
+
@ui (s; t)
@t
=   [i (s)m (1 + ei (s)) + n]ui (s; t) (10)
ui (0; t) = ni (0) (11)
The total size of the cohort of duration s unemployed is u (s; t) = ug (s; t)+ub (s; t). Finally, the number
of job-seekers is U (t) =
R1
0
u (s; t) ds. Given that we only focus on a steady-state, @ui (s; t) =@t = 0 and
the dependence vis-à-vis time t will be neglected.
Let  (s) denote the pdf of the distribution of unemployment duration, while i (s) denotes the
proportion of type-i unemployed conditional on duration s. By construction
 (s) =
u (s)
U
(12)
i (s) =
ui (s)
ug (s) + ub (s)
(13)
Finally, let pi (s) denote the probability of contacting a type-i worker conditional on contacting a worker
whose unemployment duration is s. Random matching implies that
pi (s) =
m [1 + ei (s)]ui (s)
m [1 + eg (s)]ug (s) +m [1 + eb (s)]ub (s)
(14)
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Proposition 2 Distribution of types and unemployment spells
Under Assumptions A1 to A3,
g (s) =
(
0
0+(1 0)em(1 )s if s < 
0
0+(1 0)e mh+m(1+h )s if s 2 [;]
(15)
pg (s) =
(
0
0+(1 0)em(1 )s if s < 
(1+h)0
(1+h)0+(1 0)e mh+m(1+h )s if s 2 [;]
(16)
 (s) =
P
i=g;b ni (0) exp
  R s
0
[mi (z) (1 + ei (z)) + n] dz
	R1
0
P
i=g;b ni (0) exp
  R x
0
[mi (z) (1 + ei (z)) + n] dz
	
dx
8s 2 [0;1) (17)
where , eg (s) and eb (s) are dened in Proposition 1
Figure 2 depicts the pattern of the proportion of good workers by unemployment duration.
[Insert Figure 2]
As the hazard rate of good workers is always higher than the hazard rate of bad workers, the proportion
of good workers falls with the duration of unemployment. Indeed,
0g (s) =  m [1 + eg (s)  ]g (s) [1  g (s)] < 0 (18)
Note that the function g is continuous on [0;M], while its derivative is not continuous in , when good
workers start searching harder.
Figure 3 depicts the pattern of the proportion of good agents by contact among individuals who have
spent the duration s in unemployment.
[Insert Figure 3]
The function pg is strictly decreasing on each interval where it is continuous. Indeed,
p0g (s) =  m [1 + eg (s)  ] pg (s) [1  pg (s)] < 0 (19)
However, the function pg jumps upwards in , as good workers suddenly become overrepresented among
the applicants.
This discontinuity is important because the function pg shapes employersbeliefs on the composition
of applicants by duration. The resulting hiring policy must be consistent with the one that has been
postulated in Assumption A1. Typically, the existence of an equilibrium will require that lim
s" 
pg (s) >
pg (). The probability of contacting a good agent conditional on contacting an unemployed person of
duration  must be larger than the probability of contacting a good agent conditional on contacting an
unemployed person of duration . Figure 3 has been drawn assuming that this restriction holds.
Finally, note that the pdf of the unemployment duration distribution has three properties: it is
continuous on the support [0;], it is strictly decreasing in s, reecting the fact that none can enter the
distribution at some positive duration, and its derivative is discontinuous in s = , as good workers start
nding jobs at a faster rate.
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2.4 Firm behavior
Let V > b denote the value of a vacant position, while i is the value of a job lled by a worker of type
i. We have7
V =   + m

Esmax fEi [i   V j s] ; 0g (20)
ri = yi   w (21)
Firms endowed with a vacant slot have to predict the type of workers they may meet. They do so on
the basis of (i) the unemployment duration s that they observe, (ii) their expectation on the trajectory
of individual search e¤orts, and (iii) the probability  2 (0; 1) of not detecting a bad worker at the time
of interview.
Good workers do not send bad signals. Firms, therefore, can immediately detect a bad worker when
they receive a bad signal. As b < V , rms always reject such workers.
It follows that
Ei [i   V j s] = Pr (signal is good) Pr (worker is good j signal is good) (g   V )
+Pr (signal is good) Pr (worker is bad j signal is good) (b   V )
+Pr (signal is bad) 0
Firmsbeliefs on workerstypes obey the Bayes rule. Therefore,
Pr (worker is good j signal is good) = Pr (worker is good \ signal is good)
Pr (signal is good)
=
pg (s)
pg (s) + pb (s)
and
Pr (worker is bad j signal is good) = Pr (worker is bad \ signal is good)
Pr (signal is good)
=
pb (s)
pg (s) + pb (s)
For a particular rm, we have
V =   + m

Z 1
0
 (s)max f[pg (s) (g   V ) + (1  pg (s)) (b   V )] ; 0g ds (22)
Expected prots depend on two distributions: the distribution of unemployment durations, and the
distribution of workerstypes conditional on contact and unemployment duration8 . Firms hiring policyei (s) follows.
7Equation (21) assumes that the job is destroyed whenever the worker retires. This assumption is innocuous, because
the value of a vacancy V is driven to 0 in equilibrium.
8Note that unemployable workers participate in the search market. This results from the cost structure of search e¤orts:
given zero cost for a low e¤ort, agents are marginally indi¤erent between searching for a job or not. Assuming an "-cost
would su¢ ce to prevent non-employable workers from searching. In such a case, one would have to consider the distribution
of unemployment duration conditional on the fact that i (s) > 0. Working of the model would not be a¤ected.
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Proposition 3 Firmshiring strategy
The policy function ei (s) is such that
ei (s) =
(
i if pg (s)    b Vg b (1 )V
0 else
A duration-s type-i worker that is interviewed is hired with probability i if the proportion of good
workers among contacted workers is su¢ ciently large, and is not hired if not.
Finally, there is free entry of new rms on the search market. This drives the value V of vacancy to
zero.
3 Equilibrium time-dependence in hazard rates
This section considers the equilibrium of the model. We proceed in three steps. First, we study the
existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. Second, we make comparative exercises and study how hazard
rates respond to changes in the design of unemployment compensation. Finally, we discuss the impact of
the exhaustion date on mean unemployment duration.
3.1 Equilibrium
In a symmetric equilibrium, all rms have the same hiring policy i (s), all workers of the same type
have the same job search behavior ei (s), agents maximize their gains, and expectations are compatible
with equilibrium outcomes. We focus on the particular type of equilibrium that we have highlighted
so far. Given that our framework may feature other types of equilibrium, we need to di¤erentiate this
equilibrium from other types. In the sequel, we will call it the baseline equilibrium.
Denition Baseline equilibrium
A baseline equilibrium is a vector (;; ) and a set of four functions (eg; eb;  ; pg) such that
(i) eb (s) = 0 for all s  0 and eg (s) = h i¤ s 2 [;], where  is dened in Proposition 1
(ii)  and pg are dened in Proposition 2
(iii) For i = g; b, fi (s) = efi (s) = i i¤ s 2 [0;], where efi (s) is dened in Proposition 3
(iv) V = 0
(v) 0 <  < T < 
(i) states that the postulated job-seeking behavior is optimal for both types of workers. (ii) recalls
that the distribution of unemployment duration and the proportion of good workers by duration are
implied by individual strategies. (iii) states that the postulated hiring policy is optimal for rms. (iv)
is the free-entry condition. Finally, (v) makes clear that good workers set a high search intensity before
benets have elapsed and potential employers discriminate against the long-term unemployed after the
loss of benet entitlement.
11
Proposition 4 Existence and uniqueness of a baseline equilibrium
(i) In a baseline equilibrium, we have
 = T + ln
24 v (bmax) + c r+mm   v (w)
v (bmax)  v (bmin) +

m (1 + h) v(w) v(bmin)r   ch

e (r+m(1+h))( T )
35 1r+m(1+h)(JS)
 =
h
1 + h   +
1
m (1 + h  ) ln

yg   w
 (w   yb)
0 (1 + h)
1  0

(HS)
 =
m

Z 
0
 (s) [pg (s)g + (1  pg (s))b] ds (FE)
(ii) There may exist a baseline equilibrium
(iii) If a baseline equilibrium exists, it is unique
(i) The (JS) locus results from good workersequilibrium job search strategy. The (HS) locus results
from rmsequilibrium hiring strategy. This strategy implies that pg () =  b= (g   b), which
yields (HS). Finally, tightness results from the free-entry condition. This yields (FE). Given that we
assume that job search e¤orts do not create congestion e¤ects, tightness determination has no feed-back
e¤ects on individual choices. Solving the equilibrium can be reduced to nding a couple (;) that
satises (JS) and (HS).
(ii) We provide during the proof of Proposition 4 the set of necessary and su¢ cient conditions leading
to the existence of a baseline equilibrium. These conditions are not particularly appealing. Indeed, we
must check that (JS) and (HS) intersect at least once. We must also check that 0 <  < T < . Finally,
we must check that lim
s! 
pg (s)  pg (). This leads to four inequalities that dene the parameter space
compatible with the existence of a baseline equilibrium. Of course, we show that this parameter space is
nonempty.
(iii) The (JS) locus and the (HS) are both strictly increasing. On the one hand, a longer cut-o¤
duration raises the value of search, and good workers delay the moment at which they start searching
with high intensity. On the other hand, an increase in  raises the proportion of bad workers at all
durations. In turn, this leads rms to delaying the duration above which they reject all applications.
However, the slope of the (JS) curve is always lower than the slope of the (HS) curve. This establishes
the uniqueness of equilibrium.
Note that there is a single equilibrium in our model, while there may be multiple equilibria in Lock-
woods. This is so because Lockwood assumes that the matching rate m depends on the market tightness
. This originates a feed-back e¤ect from job creation to the composition of unemployment. Namely, job
protability increases with the mean productivity of the job-seekers. But, tightness raises such a mean
productivity. Job protability may increase with tightness as a result, which explains multiple equilibria.
Abstracting from such feed-back e¤ects allows us to focus on the novelty of our paper: the interaction
between workerssearch and employershiring strategies.
Figure 4 depicts the equilibrium.
[Insert Figure 4]
Proposition 4 allows us to interpret the duration-dependence in hazard rates observed in the data as
an equilibrium outcome. This results from the interplay between job search and hiring strategies in an
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environment characterized by matching frictions, worker heterogeneity and asymmetric information on
workerstypes. Employers have no reasons to discriminate against the unemployed before the exhaustion
date because good workers have strong reasons to stay unemployed. Things become di¤erent after the
exhaustion date because good workers should manage to exit unemployment around the exhaustion
date. This explains the fall in hazards after the exhaustion date: employers reject the applications of
unemployed who have no reasons to stay unemployed unless they are of the bad type.
3.2 Changes in unemployment compensation scheme
In this Subsection, we examine the impacts of unemployment compensation on equilibrium hazard rates.
Proposition 5 Properties of the baseline equilibrium
Assume that there exists a baseline equilibrium. Then,
(i)  and  are strictly increasing in bmin, bmax and T
(ii) as h tends to innity,  and  tend to T
(i) shows that the various components of unemployment compensation generosity originate moral
hazard e¤ects that are detrimental to search e¤orts. Confronted with a more generous scheme, good
workers wait longer to make high search e¤orts and  increases. However, such moral hazard e¤ects
alter the signalling value of unemployment duration. The probability of recruiting a good worker increases
at all durations. In turn, employers are less reluctant to hire the long-term unemployed and the cut-o¤
duration  also increases.
Figure 4 depicts these e¤ects of unemployment insurance. The components of unemployment insurance
only a¤ect the (JS) locus that shifts rightward. The equilibrium moves along the (HS) locus that is
positively sloped.  and  increase as a result.
(ii) shows that  and  tend to T in the non-frictional case where h becomes arbitrarily large.
Indeed, good workers await the exhaustion date to set the high search e¤ort. They immediately exit
unemployment and no good workers remain among the cohort of unemployed. Employers expect this and
do not hire the workers who have overtaken the exhaustion date in unemployment.
According to (i), all the di¤erent components of unemployment insurance originate moral hazard
e¤ects. But, this says nothing about the magnitude of the di¤erent e¤ects. (ii) tells us that the magnitude
depends on parameter h. In the non-frictional case where h tends to innity, the potential duration of
benets governs equilibrium hazard rates, while replacement rates bmax and bmin have no impacts.
This provides a simple explanation to the fact that estimated hazard rates respond less to changes
in benet levels than to changes in potential duration. If good workers can activate a su¢ ciently e¢ -
cient technology, they massively exit the unemployment state around the exhaustion date. This drives
employersbeliefs who reject all the applicants of a cohort whose unemployment duration is larger than
T .
Proposition 5 tells a general lesson. The design of unemployment insurance a¤ects the signalling value
of unemployment duration. This should be taken into account by policy makers.
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3.3 From benet expiration to mean unemployment duration
The model can explain why hazard rates mostly respond to the potential duration of benets. However,
the model does not necessarily predict that the average unemployment duration always increases with the
exhaustion date. On the one hand, good workers respond to the exhaustion date by delaying high-intensity
search. This tends to raise the mean duration. On the other hand, rms are less discriminating against
the long-term unemployed, which benets the bad workers. This tends to lower the mean duration.
Formally, group-i specic mean duration is
si =
Z 1
0
e 
R s
0
(mi(z)(1+ei(z))+n)dzds (23)
In the limit case where h tends to innity, we obtain
sg =
1  e (m+n)T
m+ n
(24)
sb =
1  e (m+n)T
m+ n
+
e (m+n)T
n
(25)
Good workersdurations are truncated in the exhaustion date T , date at which they immediately exit the
unemployment state. Their mean duration increases with T . Bad workers do not escape unemployment
at the exhaustion date. Rather, they start being discriminated against afterwards. As a consequence,
dsb=dT < 0, and their mean duration decreases with T .
Consider a worker who has just entered unemployment. This worker is good with probability 0
and bad with probability 1   0. Therefore, the expected unemployment duration for such a worker is
s = 0sg + (1  0) sb. A marginal increase in the exhaustion date leads to
ds
dT
= e (m+n)T
h
0e
 (1 )mT   (1  0)
i
(26)
The mean duration of unemployment increases with the exhaustion date whenever 0e (1 )mT >
(1  0).
The main reason why the potential duration of benets has an ambiguous impact on mean unem-
ployment duration is the fact that bad workers do not react to changes in unemployment compensation
schemes. Unemployment insurance originates moral hazard e¤ects for the good, and not for the bad. In
subsection 4.1, we discuss another equilibrium conguration in which good and bad workers start seeking
jobs with a high intensity. In this case, the mean duration increases with the exhaustion date.
4 Discussions
In this section, we discuss several aspects of our model. First, we consider two theoretical issues: the
existence of alternative equilibrium congurations, and the case of endogenous wage. Then, we turn to
empirical considerations: the model makes predictions on individual hazards that may be confronted to
data, and we also make particular assumptions as to employersinformation set that merit discussion.
4.1 Alternative equilibrium congurations
In this subsection, we explore the alternative equilibrium congurations that our model may feature.
Doing so, we provide further motivations for our focus on a baseline equilibrium.
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The panel of Figures 5 shows various combinations of hazard rates for good and bad agents. Each
conguration corresponds to a di¤erent type of equilibrium. The baseline equilibrium is depicted by
Figure 5a to make the comparison easier.
[Insert panel of Figures 5]
Figure 5b shows a Lockwood equilibrium, in which good and bad workers never seek jobs with a high
intensity. This type of equilibrium may arise when m [v (w)  v (bmin)] < rc, which is not compatible
with assumption A3. In such a case, good agentsmarginal return to high search e¤ort is lower than
marginal cost. A Lockwood equilibrium also arises when h tends to 0. In a Lockwood equilibrium,
unemployment insurance design has no e¤ects on job search behavior, and, therefore, no impacts on
employersexpectations and recruitment strategies.
Figure 5c depicts a credible set of hazard rates. Both good and bad workers start seeking jobs with
high intensity before the exhaustion date. Such a pooling equilibrium may arise when assumption A2
does not hold. The threshold duration is b for bad workers, while it is g for good workers. Figure 5c
assumes that g > b, but we may also have g < b. The striking feature is that g generally di¤ers
from b. In a pooling equilibrium, unemployment compensation originates moral hazard e¤ects on all the
individuals. However, given that good workers benet from a higher hazard rate at given search e¤ort,
the main results featured by Proposition 5 should not be a¤ected. In particular, g, 

b , and 
 would
tend to the exhaustion date T as h would tend to innity.
Interestingly, this equilibrium conguration may lead to non-ambiguous predictions concerning the
impact of the exhaustion date on mean unemployment duration. Consider for instance the case where h
tends to innity. In such a case, the mean durations of good and bad workers are
sg =
1  e (m+n)T
m+ n
(27)
sb =
1  e (m+n)T
m+ n
(28)
The two durations are now increasing in T . As a result, the average mean duration increases with the
exhaustion date.
We have decided not to focus on this equilibrium since it is associated with a technical di¢ culty
that obscures the main message of the paper. When a given group of individuals start seeking jobs with
a high intensity, this originates a discontinuity in the function pg that shapes the proportion of good
workers among contacted individuals of a given unemployment duration. This function plays a key role
as this drives employersexpectations on workerstypes. This discontinuity gives birth to a parametric
restriction to make sure that the proportion pg stays larger than the threshold implied by the zero-prot
condition. With two groups of workers, the function pg is discontinuous in g (where it jumps upward)
and b (where it jumps downward). The former case is covered by the denition of a baseline equilibrium.
The latter case would be associated to a new parametric restriction.
Figures 5d to 5f show equilibrium congurations that are not empirically credible. In Figure 5d, the
function pg decreases so rapidly that rms discriminate against the unemployed before good agents seek
jobs at a high intensity. Then, rms hire the workers again, before turning down all the applicants once
the nal duration  is reached. In Figures 5e, good workers start seeking jobs after the exhaustion date
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( > T ), while rms set a termination date shorter than the exhaustion date ( < T ) in Figure 5f. These
equilibria imply that hazard rates do not peak at the exhaustion date.
4.2 Endogenous wage
The wage does not depend on unemployment duration. This may result from some minimum wage, or
collective wage setting. However, one may discuss two alternative assumptions.
First, rms may set the wage as in Lockwood (1991). The monopsony wage would be set so as to
guarantee that Wg (s) = Ug (s). Firms have no reasons to choose a wage that yields a utility level larger
than the utility reached by a good unemployed person. Similarly, they would not set a lower wage, because
good workers would refuse the jobs. The equilibrium wage decreases over the unemployment duration
from 0 to the exhaustion date T . However, this would leave no search incentive to the good workers9 .
They would never set the high search e¤ort as a result. Meanwhile, unemployment compensation would
not alter workerssearch incentives.
Second, there could be wage bargaining over match surplus without possible renegotiation. One of
the playerstypes is unknown to the other player at the time of interview. One way to deal with this
issue is to consider a simple process of take-it-or-leave-it o¤er where the player who initiates the o¤er
is chosen randomly. For simplicity, we consider risk-neutral individuals. Assume that a worker whose
unemployment duration is s meets an employer endowed with a vacancy. Suppose that the rm makes
the o¤er with probability 1   . The rm wont o¤er less than Ug (s). If the worker is good, he will
refuse the o¤er. If the worker is bad, he will refuse the contract too. If he accepted, he would reveal
that he is bad, leading the rm to reject his application. Similarly, the rm wont o¤er more than Ug (s).
The worker makes the o¤er with probability . The rm obtains 0 in that case, while the worker gets
the whole pie. Due to type uncertainty, the worker obtains Y (s) = Ei [Yi j s], with Yi = yi=r. As Ug
and Y fall over time, the mean wage falls with unemployment duration. The termination date  is set
so that Y () = Ug (). Good workers obtain no rents at the exhaustion date. This implies that they
do not seek jobs with a high intensity around the exhaustion date. This may be compatible with the
fact that hazard rates peak at the exhaustion date, but this requires additional parametric restrictions.
The xed-wage assumption allows these additional di¢ culties to be neglected, without losing the main
insights.
4.3 From theoretical to empirical hazards
The signalling argument relies on the coexistence of two subpopulations. They correspond to the divide
between movers and stayers highlighted by the empirical literature on unobserved heterogeneity. In our
paper as in Lockwood, the distinction between movers and stayers is an equilibrium outcome. A key
feature of this approach is that ex-ante heterogeneity shapes employersand workersbeliefs in a way
that originates true duration dependence in hazard rates.
Hazard rates have three main properties in our model: (i) they are piecewise continuous, (ii) unob-
served good workers benet from a higher exit rate at all durations than unobserved bad workers, (iii)
good workersand bad workershazards respond di¤erently to benet exhaustion.
9There would be no more rents for bad workers. In equilibrium, Wg (s) =Wb (s) = Ug (s) = Ub (s) =
R1
s e
 r(t s)b (t) dt.
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(i) is consistent with piecewise constant hazard models introduced by Lancaster (1990). In such
models, the hazard is typically written as follows
 (s j x) = 0 (s) l (x) (29)
where x is a vector of observed individual characteristics, and 0 is the baseline hazard. The duration
axis is divided into M intervals with
0 (s) =
8>>>><>>>>:
1 if s 2 [0; 1]
2 if s 2 (1; 2]
:::
M if s 2 (M 1;1)
(30)
where k are constant and k are dene points in time, 0 < 1 < 2 < ::: < M 1 <1.
In our model, workers have all the same observed characteristics. However, the analysis can be gen-
eralized to workers with heterogenous observed characteristics, with the assumption that search markets
are segmented by observed characteristics. In the case of good workers, our model predicts three time
intervals (M = 3), with 1 = , 2 = , 1 = m, 2 = m (1 + h) and 3 = 0.
(ii) Our model hinges on the fact that there are two groups of workers on each market segment, the
good and the bad, that cannot be di¤erentiated by employers. These proportions may or may not di¤er
between observable groups, yet the intuition suggests that the initial proportion of good workers should
increase with skill level. This means that there is unobserved heterogeneity, and the econometrician
should account for it.
(iii) There are several ways to model unobserved heterogeneity to capture the mover-stayer dichotomy.
However, they are not all compatible with our model. The simplest way to deal with unobserved het-
erogeneity is to assume that there is an individual specic component " in hazard that is independent of
both s and x. Formally,
 (s j x; ") = 0 (s) l (x) " (31)
It is then usual to assume a simple functional form for the distribution of the error term, like the Gamma
distribution, or, closer to our model, a discrete distribution (see Lancaster, 1979).
However, this hazard function implies that the two subpopulations must experience similar qualitative
patterns in baseline hazard rates. By contrast, our model predicts distinctive qualitative patterns across
the two groups of workers. In other words, the individual component " should not be independent of s 
and probably of x as well. This requirement may be too strong to be compatible with identication, yet
it is an essential feature of our model.
4.4 Further evidence
Dormont et al (2006) provide another type of evidence. They estimate hazard rates by pre-unemployment
earnings. They show that the hazard rate of formerly high-paid workers features a spike, while the hazard
rate of formerly low-paid workers is fairly smooth around the exhaustion date. Of course, the distinction
between low-paid and high-paid workers does not really t with our model in which there is a single wage.
However, this suggests that ability to respond to benet exhaustion should be positively correlated to
skill level.
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In addition, our model provides a simple explanation to Dormont et al nding. Suppose that there
is a separate search market for each skill, and that formerly high-paid workers compete on the high-skill
segment, while formerly low-paid workers compete on the low-skill segment. Suppose also that for one
reason or another, estimation techniques used by Dormont et al fail to identify the two groups of workers
in each segment. In such a case, they estimate the average hazard among each group of workers. Provided
that the proportion of good workers increases with skill level, our model predicts that the mean average
rate and the mean peak in such a rate should be higher among the formerly higher-paid workers than
among the formerly lower-paid workers.
4.5 Employersinformation set
Our model hinges on the assumption that employers can observe both ones unemployment duration and
ones potential duration of benets.
Several other papers assume that employers observe the unemployment duration (see e.g. Blanchard
and Diamond, 1994, Coles and Masters, 2000). They rely on the fact that cvs implicitly display this
information, or that employers should be able to obtain it during the interview. Oberholzer-Gee (2008)
o¤ers empirical evidence consistent with this view. He sent applications to jobs advertised in a Swiss
newspaper. Applicants only di¤ered with respect to employment status (employed, nonemployed) and
unemployment duration (if unemployed). He shows that the longer the spell of nonemployment, the lower
is the probability that rms will invite a job applicant for an interview.
The potential duration of benets may or may not be di¢ cult to observe. There are two main
obstacles.
First, eligibility rules may be very complicated. They can vary with former job duration or de-
mographic characteristics. Nevertheless, employers should always be able to evaluate the applicants
situation vis-à-vis the benet system using the information displayed by the applicants cv (former job
duration and current unemployment duration). In addition, there are certain regularities that depend
on the type of advertised job that should be known by employers. For instance, a senior position should
mostly attract relatively experienced workers who entered unemployment with full coverage and maxi-
mum potential duration10 (or, similarly, workers beneting from a longer duration because of their age
as in France, Germany or Sweden). Conversely, a very junior position should attract individuals who are
mostly non-entitled to unemployment benets.
Second, the legislation may be volatile. One interesting question concerns the impact of such volatility
on employersbeliefs vis-à-vis the long-term unemployed. Intuitively, risk-averse workers facing institu-
tional uncertainty should be more prompt to exit the unemployment state. Unless labor market skills and
risk aversion are too negatively correlated, this e¤ect should be stronger for the good workers. Overall,
the quality of the signal conveyed by unemployment duration should increase with institutional volatility,
strengthening employersdiscrimination vis-à-vis the long-term unemployed. The rigorous formalization
of this argument is left for future work.
However, employers are likely to know whether one is covered by unemployment benets or not.
10One may argue that signalling problems are less relevant for such workers who have a long work record. This perspective
abstracts from human capital transferability problems. For instance, human capital accumulated during the previous job
could either be purely specic (in such a case, the worker is bad) or fully transferable to a new job (in such a case the
worker is good).
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Indeed, it is in the interest of covered workers to say and prove that they are covered. An unemployed
worker who is no longer covered can easily be detected in such a case.
5 Conclusion
This paper is a theoretical contribution to the literature on job search and unemployment. We revisit
the signalling hypothesis, whereby potential employers use the duration of unemployment as a signal
on the productivity of applicants. We suggest that the quality of such a signal is very low when the
unemployed get unemployment benets: individuals have good reasons to stay unemployed. Conversely,
the signal becomes much more e¢ cient once benets have elapsed: skilled workers should not remain
unemployed in such cases. Therefore, the potential duration of unemployment benets should drive
employersexpectations and their recruitment practices. This mechanism can explain why hazards fall
after benet expiration, and why hazards respond more to the potential duration of benets than to
replacement rates.
Our paper can be extended in two directions. First, we plan to enrich agentsdecision sets to account
for non-trivial search and recruitment strategies. Such a model could be calibrated on country data and
used to simulate policy changes. Second, beyond its focus on hazard rates, our paper tells that the design
of unemployment compensation alters the signalling value of unemployment duration. This should be
taken into account by policy makers. Policy implications such as the design of optimal unemployment
insurance are on our research agenda.
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APPENDIX
A Proof of Proposition 1
Given Assumption A1, the resolution of the maximization problem () is given in the main text that
precedes Proposition 1.
(i) results from Step 1 of the resolution and Assumption A2.
(ii) results from Step 2, Step 3, and Assumption A3.
By solving, Assumptions A1 to A3 are not only su¢ cient but also necessary conditions.
B Proof of Proposition 2
Assumption A1 to A4 imply that Proposition 1 holds. Therefore,
eb (s) = 0 for all s  0 (32)
and
eg (s) =
(
h if s 2 [;]
0 else
(33)
Solving the Cauchy problem (10)-(11) leads to
ui (s) = ni (0) exp

 
Z s
0
[fi (z)m (1 + ei (z)) + n] dz

(34)
One can use these di¤erent equations and the denitions of  , g and pg given in the main text to show
(i) to (iii).
C Proof of Proposition 3
The main text makes it clear that ei (s) = i i¤
pg (s) (g   V ) + (1  pg (s)) (b   V )  0 (35)
The result follows.
D Proof of Proposition 4
(i) follows from the denition of a baseline equilibrium. The (JS) locus is implied by Proposition 1.
The (HS) locus results from Proposition 2, Proposition 3 and the free-entry assumption V = 0. From
Proposition 3 and free entry, fi (s) = i i¤ s 2 [0;] implies that pg () =  b= (g   b). From
Proposition 2, the function pg is continuous and strictly decreasing on (;]. It follows that  =
p 1g ( b= (g   b)). The computation leads to (HS). Finally, the (FE) locus results from imposing
V = 0 in equation (22) that denes the value of a vacancy.
(ii) The denition of baseline equilibrium involves nding a positive vector (;; ) that solves (JS),
(HS) and (FE), and satises
m [v (w)  v (bmin)] < rc (36)
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0 <  < T <  (37)
lim
s" 
pg (s) >  b= (g   b) (38)
 and  are jointly determined by (JS) and (HS). Then  follows from (FE). Therefore, the solution can
be reduced to nding  and  that solve (JS) and (HS) and satisfy conditions (36) to (38).
We now provide necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the existence of a baseline equilibrium.
Lemma 1. Let
A1 = v (bmax) + c
r +m
m
  v (w)
A2 = v (bmax)  v (bmin)
A3 = m (1 + h)
v (w)  v (bmin)
r
  ch
A4 = ln

yg   w
 (w   yb)
0
1  0 (1 + h)

Let also
a1 = r +m (1 + h)
a2 = m (1 + h  )
Consider the function P : R! R such that
P (x) = A2e
 a1T ea1x +A3 (ea1x)
1 
1+h  e 
a1
a2
A4  A1
There exists a baseline equilibrium i¤
m [v (w)  v (bmin)] < rc (C1)
P (max f0; Z1g) < 0 (C2)
P (min fT;Z2g) > 0 (C3)
where
Z1 =
1 + h  
h
(T  A4=a2)
Z2 =
1
m (1  ) ln

yg   w
 (w   yb)
0
1  0

Proof. Note rst that bad agents never set the high e¤ort i¤ condition (C1) holds. Using
(HS), one can replace  in (JS). After simple computations, one obtains
P () = 0
The function P is strictly increasing, with P ( 1) =  A1 and P (1) = 1. It follows
that there is a unique  such that P () = 0. This  and associated  given by (HS)
is an equilibrium candidate. This candidate must satisfy constraints (36) to (38). First,
 > 0 i¤ P (0) < 0. Second,  < T i¤ P (T ) > 0. Third, using (HS), one can see that
 > T is equivalent to  > Z1. Therefore,  > T i¤ P (Z1) < 0. Fourth, lim
s" 
pg (s) >
 b= (g   b) is equivalent to  < p 1g ( b= (g   b)). In turn, this is equivalent
to P (Z2) > 0. Conditions C2 and C3 result from these four cases.
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To conclude the proof, we show that the parameter space dened by conditions C1 to C3 is nonempty.
The parameters are set as follows: r = 5%, 0 = 0:45, m = 1:0, c = 0:31;  = 0:3, bmin = 0:3, bmax = 0:6,
T = :5, w = 1:0, yg = 1:2, yb = 0:8, v (x) = 1:0x0:5. Figure 6 depicts the resulting equilibrium  and
 as h goes from 0 to 100.
[Insert Figure 6]
(iii) Uniqueness is a by-product of the former proof.
E Proof of Proposition 5
(i) The (HS) locus does not depend on the parameters that shape the unemployment compensation
scheme. Therefore, we only need to know how bmin; bmax and T a¤ect the (JS) locus. This locus results
from
m

W   x2i (;; bmin; bmax; T )

= c (39)
The function x2i is strictly increasing in bmin, bmax (for  < T ) and T . It is also strictly decreas-
ing in . It follows that @ (; bmin; bmax; T ) =@bmin > 0, @ (; bmin; bmax; T ) =@bmax > 0, and
@ (; bmin; bmax; T ) =@T > 0. In each case, the (JS) locus shifts rightward in Figure 4. The result
follows.
(ii) As h tends to innity, the (HS) locus tends to the 45-degree line so that  = , while the (JS)
locus tends to the vertical line  = T . Therefore,  and  tend to T .
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Not to be published Numerical simulations
We use Matlab to simulate the model and nd equilibrium values for  and  as h varies from very
small (h = 0:1) to very large (h = 100). The results are reported by Figure 6. The program is based
on Appendix D, where we give necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the existence of a unique baseline
equilibrium. The program nds the roots of the function P (x), and checks the set of constraints (C1) to
(C3). There are two curves, corresponding to  and . These two curves are plain blue whenever all
the constraints are satised. They are dashed red whenever one of the constraints is not satised.
It is di¢ cult to satisfy all the constraints for all possible values of h. In our search for an adequate
parameterization, we proceeded as follows. First, set the wage w and the parameters of the benet
system: potential duration T , high replacement rate bmax, low replacement rate bmin. We normalize w to
1 and broadly replicate the US system with T = 0:5, bmax = 0:6, and bmin = 0:3. Second, set preference
parameters: e¤ective discount rate r, utility function v. We set r = 5%, and v (x) = x1=2. Then, set
the contact rate per unit of search e¤ort m, and the probability that a bad worker sends a good signal
. We set m = 1:0, and  = 0:3. This implies that bad workers need on average three interviews to get
hired when good workers need one. Then you can use the residual set of parameters to match the various
constraints. The marginal search cost c governs the (JS) locus, while yg and yb the output levels, and 0
the initial proportion of good workers, a¤ect the (HS) locus. We normalize yg to 1:2 and yb to 0:8 so that
the marginal productivity of good workers is 20% larger than their wage, while the marginal productivity
of bad workers is 20% lower than their wage. Finally, we set c to 3:1 and 0 to 0:45 to match constraints
(C1) to (C3). Once there are only two parameters to play with, this may take some time to nd the
correct combination remember that we must check all the constraints for all possible values for h, that
is from the case where high search e¤orts are as e¢ cient as low e¤orts to the Walrasian case where high
search e¤orts instantaneously provide a job.
Here is the program that can be copied and pasted in the Matlab Editor.
% September 2008
% Simulations based on Appendix D
% This program computes sigma and delta as functions of h
% The main results are summarized by Figure 1
clc
clear all
close all
% Model parameters
syms z; %duration of employability; "Delta" in the model
syms g; %unemployment duration above which good workers search with high intensity; "sigma" in
the model
syms s; %unemployment duration
r=0.05; %e¤ective discount rate
pi1=0.45; %initial proportion of good workers
pi2=1-pi1; %initial proportion of bad workers
c=3.1; %marginal search cost - e¤ort cost is C(e)=c*e
m=1.0; %matching parameter - contact rate is m(1+e)
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n=0.03; %exogenous exit rate
rho=r-n;
f=0.3; %probability that a bad worker sends a good signal; phi in the model
bmin=0.3; %unemployment benet after potential duration
bmax=0.6; %unemployment benet before potential duration
w=1.0; %wage
y1=1.2; %output produced by good workers
y2=0.8; %output produced by bad workers
v=@(x) 1.0*(x^0.5); %utility function
W=v(w)/r; %expected utility reached by an employed worker
T=0.5; %potential duration of unemployment benets
% Simulation
h=0.1; %high search e¤ort
% Stage 0: Checking condition C1
if f*m*(v(w)-v(bmin))>r*c
attentionC1=warning! C1 is not checked!
h=100
end
i=1; %counter
while h<100
% Stage 1: Computing the various constant
A1=v(bmax)+c*(r+m)/m-v(w);
A2=v(bmax)-v(bmin);
A3=m*(1+h)*(v(w)-v(bmin))/r-c*h;
A4=log(((y1-w)/(f*(w-y2)))*(pi1/pi2)*(1+h));
a1=r+m*(1+h);
a2=m*(1+h-f);
Z1=((1+h-f)/h)*(T-A4/a2);
Z2=1/(m*(1-f))*log(((y1-w)/(f*(w-y2)))*(pi1/pi2));
P=@(x) A2*exp((x-T)*a1)+A3*exp(a1*x*(1-f)/(1+h-f))*exp(-(a1/a2)*A4)-A1;
% Stage 2: Checking conditions C2 and C3
in(i)=0;
in2(i)=0; %C2
in3(i)=0; %C3
C2=max(0,Z1);
if P(C2)>0
attentionC2=warning! C2 is not checked! P(max(0,Z1)) must be lower than 0.;
in(i)=1;
in2(i)=1;
end
C3=min(T,Z2);
if P(C3)<0
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attentionC3=warning! C3 is not checked! P(min(T,Z2)) must be larger than 0.;
in(i)=1;
in3(i)=1;
end
% Stage 3: Computing sigma and delta in equilibrium
options = optimset(MaxFunEvals,10000)
g=fsolve(P,1.5,options); %computing sigma
z=h/(1+h-f)*g+1/m/(1+h-f)*log((y1-w)/f/(w-y2)*pi1*(1+h)/pi2); %computing delta
Hs(i)=h; %vector that contains the various h
Gs(i)=g; %vector that contains the various equilibrium sigma
Zs(i)=z ;%vector that contains the various equilibrium delta
Vg(i)=P(Gs(i)); %ex-post checking that P(sigma)=0
h=h+2;
i=i+1;
end
% Stage 4: Organizing the results
in=logical(in);
in2=logical(in2);
in3=logical(in3);
hs=Hs(in); %h for which conditions C1, and/or C2, and/or C3 are not satised
zs=Zs(in); %delta
gs=Gs(in); %sigma
hs_2=Hs(in2); %h for which condition C2 is not satised
zs_2=Zs(in2); %delta
gs_2=Gs(in2); %sigma
hs_3=Hs(in3); %h for which condition C3 is not satised
zs_3=Zs(in3); %delta
gs_3=Gs(in3); %sigma
% Stage 5: Presenting the results
gure(1)
plot(Hs,Gs)%,.)
hold on
plot(hs,gs,w)
plot(hs,gs,.r)
plot(Hs,Zs)%,.)
plot(hs,zs,w)
plot(hs,zs,.r)
plot([Hs(1) Hs(i-1)], [T T],g)
title(sigma and Delta as functions of h)
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Fig.1 : Hazard rates of good and bad workers – Baseline equilibrium 
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Fig.2: Proportion of good workers by unemployment duration – Baseline 
equilibrium 
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Fig.3: Probability of contacting a good worker by unemployment duration – 
Baseline equilibrium 
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Fig.4: Existence and uniqueness of a baseline equilibrium 
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Fig.5a : Baseline equilibrium 
 
 
Fig.5c : Pooling equilibrium 
 
 
Fig.5e : Late-peak equilibrium 
 
Fig.5b : Lockwood equilibrium 
 
 
Fig.5d : Hole equilibrium 
 
 
Fig.5f: Early-peak equilibrium 
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Fig.6 : Equilibrium σ* and Δ* as functions of h 
Parameters are set as follows:  
5.0
maxmin0 8210156333101455 , v(x)=x=., y.=, y., w=, T=.=., b=., b., φ, c=.., m==.%, πr bg==  
